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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEVAR C. PACK and 
CAROLYN PACK, 
---0000000---
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
HULL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
---0000000---
Case No. 18,136 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Respondents DeVar C. and Carolyn Pack commenced an action in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County against the Appellant 
seeking specific performance of a contract for the purchase and sale of 
certain real property. The case was tried before the Honorable George 
E. Ba·l l if on May 28, l 981 • 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs 
and· against the Defendant granting the Pl ai nti ffs specific perfor-
mance of the contract and judgment for attorney's fees in the sum of 
$2,000.00. Defendant submitted motions for a new trial, and to 
amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. The 
court denied each of the motions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower court, a new 
trial, or amendment of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment of the lower court. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1977 Plaintiffs and Defendant executed an "Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 11 for the purchase and sale of 
Lot 48, Plat "A 11 , Temple Heights Subdivision in Provo, Utah. That 
agreement provided, among other things, for. a purchase price of 
$17,500.00, for a down payment of $2,000.00, six monthly payments of 
$500.00, payments of $250.00 per month thereafter until paid, and 
stated 11 The 
sale: Sewer 
Uni form Real 
agreement. 
following special improvements are included in this~ 
x • • • water x • • • " The parties agreed to execute a 
Estate Contract, more formally setting forth their 
Thereafter, Defendant sent to Plaintiffs a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (hereina-fter UREC) which provided that Plaintiffs pay $300.00 
for water and sewer into the property. Plaintiffs protested that the 
UREC was not consistent with the Earnest Money or their prior under-
standing. Substantial correspondence concerning the disputes followed 
and Plaintiffs did not maintain the payment schedule. 
By letter dated October 23, 1979, Defendant gave notice that un-
1 ess payments were brought current they would "cancel this trans-
acti on 11 and assume that Pl ai nti ffs 11 acquiesce in the cancel 1 ati on • 
• • " A payment of $2,142.-00 was made in response to that letter. 
In the ensuing five months four $250.00 payments were made. One of 
those payments, together with a check for $5,666.42, was returned to 
Pl ai nti ffs with a letter purporting to cancel the transaction dated 
October 23, 1979. That check was never negotiated. Plaintiffs 
subsequently mailed an additional payment of $608.00 which check was 
never cashed. 
-2-
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Total payments made by Plaintiffs on the purchase were $8,617.00. 
The balance owed on the purchase as of July 12, 1979 was $11,372.93. 
On Jul Y 20, 1981 Defendant filed a mo ti on for a new tri a 1 sup-
ported by the affidavit of David Thomas on the grounds that material 
facts were not offered into evidence. Defendant also filed a motion 
to amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
All of said Motions were denied by the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDING THAT ANY DEFAULT IN 
PAYMENTS HAD BEEN WAIVED BY APPELLANT. 
By letter dated February 28, 1979, (R. 35) Appellant gave notice 
to the Respondents that unless payments were brought current by 
March 25, 1979, it would "cancel this transaction" and assume that 
Respondents 11 acquiesce in the cancel 1 ati on II A payment of • • • 
$2,142.00 was made in response to that letter and three subsequent 
payments were accepted. ( R. 58). No evidence was offered at trial 
of any subsequent notice of default or opportunity to cure. 
It is we 11 settled, and not disputed herein, that by accepting 
numerous non-confonning payments a party waives strict performance of 
the contract. Call v. Timber Lakes Corp., 567 P.2d 1108 (Utah, 1977), 
Tanner v • Ba ads g aa rd , 612 P • 2 d 3 4 5 ( Utah , 19 80 ) • I t i s a 1 so we 11 
settled that where strict compliance has been waived a forfeiture 
can't be enforced without notice of default and reasonable opportunity 
to cure. id. at 347, Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152, 1154 
(Utah, 1976}. 
Appell ant, ; n arguing that the delinquency in payment was not 
-3-
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waived at the ti me of the f orf ei tu re, re 1 i es on a te 1 ephone ca 11 
which is first heard of in the affidavit of David Thomas in support 
of Appellant's motion for a new trial. (R. 91-92). Clearly the 
evidence which the court had before it at the time of its ruling 
supported its finding of a waiver. The court could not possibly 
have considered an affidavit which was not yet forthcoming. Appel-
l ant has shown no basis to reverse the tri a 1 court on this point. 
The real question with regard to waiver is whether the subsequent 
affidavit required the court to grant a new trial. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON ITS OWN 
FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE WHICH WAS READILY AVAILABLE PRIOR TO 
TRIAL. .THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS SOUND DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
There are two rules which provide for new trial based upon new 
evidence. Appel 1 ants are cl early barred under those rules and are 
seeking a way around those rules under the general provision providing 
for "any other reason justifying relief ••• "Rule 60(b)(7) Utah Ru·les 
of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59(a)(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence which could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have been presented at trial. Rule 60(b)(2) 
likewise provides for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 
which could not have been discovered in time to comply with Rule 59. 
In the instant case there is no claim that the evidence which Appel-
l ant seeks to rely on could not have been presented at trial. Instead> 
Appellant seeks to obtain a new trial based upon new evidence under 
-4-
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the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant cites Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704 (Utah, 1977), as support 
for its position that it should be allowed relief from the judgment 
based upon additional evidence. In that case newly discovered 
evidence clearly showed the prior judgment to have been erronious 
and the evidence could not have been discovered in time for trial. 
id. at 705. This court has ruled that it is essential for the moving 
party to show that its new evidence could not, by due diligence, 
have been discovered in ti me for trial • Gregorson v. Jen sen, 617 
P.2d 369, 372 (Utah, 1980). It would be unjust for the court to 
require 1 ess of a showing merely because Appel 1 ant referred to a 
di ff ere n t Ru 1 e wh i ch by i ts terms i s not spec i f i ca 11 y a pp 1 i c ab l e • 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE WAS CORRECT REGARDLESS OF 
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WAS EFFECTIVE. 
The court, in its Decision {R. 83) and in the Findings of Fact 
(R. 86) states that the attempted contract termination was not con-
sistent with the requirements of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
This statement cannot be construed as a ruling that the provi s i ans 
of the Uni form Real Estate Contract were binding· on the parties. 
The court was saying that whether the Uni form Real Estate Contract 
was effective or not, the letter dated October 23, 1979 was not 
effective to terminate the contract between the parties. This state-
ment was necessitated by the confusion of the Appel 1 ant in arguing 
at the trial that the Uni form Real Estate Contract was control 1 i ng 
as to what steps were necessary for termination of the contract and 
-5-
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then arguing, in his trial brief that it was not controlling. (R. 
131, R. 73). The court had no reason to determine which standard of 
notice was required when it was clear that neither standard was met. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REF US I NG TO GRANT INTEREST TO 
APPELLANT WHERE APPELLANT HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT PAYMENT. 
The court found that the appel 1 ant refused to accept payment 
from the respondents and refused to convey the subject real property 
to the respondents. ( R. 86). The parties stipulated that a check 
of $250.00 was received by the appellant and then returned, uncashed. 
They further stipulated that an additional check of $608.00 was 
mailed to appellant which was also uncashed. It would be unjust to 
allow a party to collect interest through protracted litigation 
merely by refusing to accept payment prior to the commencement of 
the litigation. It is well settled that where one of two parties 
must suffer, the one who caused the loss must bear the burden. 
Valley Bank and Trust,Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121 (Utah, 1974). 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S ADDITIONAL CLAIMS OF ERROR IN POINT IV OF ITS BRIEF 
ARE UNSUBSTANTIATED. 
The claimed errors of law listed on page 12 of Appellant's brief 
are all adequately discussed in other points and are without merit. 
The Appellant lists, in addition, the following claims of errors of 
fact: 
1. The finding that Appellant refused to accept payments. The 
stipulation entered by the Appellant makes it clear that Appellant 
did refuse certain payments. (R. 58). 
-6-
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2. The "confusion over whether attorney fees were stipulated. 1' 
The amount of attorneys fees was stipulated. (TR. 123}. The award 
of attorneys fees was justified by the agreement between the parties. 
(Ex. 25). 
3. That the court did not consider the notice to cure given by 
David Thomas, and 4. That the court did not consider the termination 
given by David Thomas. That the court ·was fully justified in re-
fusing to grant a new trial based upon the subsequent affidavit of 
David Thomas is adequately discussed in Point II. 
The "many errors of 1 aw and fact 11 cl aimed by Appel 1 ant were not 
errors at al 1. The fact that Appel 1 ant cl aims to have addi ti anal 
evidence which it chose not to produce at trial is not a basis for 
reversal of the trial court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings that any default in payments had been 
waived, that Appellant was not entitled to interest, that Appellant 
failed to give adequate notice of default and opportunity to cure, 
and that Respondents were entitled to a decree of specific performance 
are fully supported by the evidence. Appellant is not entitled to a 
new trial based upon its own failure to produce evidence which was 
readily available at the time of trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John G. Mu l l i ner 
-7-
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